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FOREWORD 
The International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis 
is preparing a Handbook of Systems Analysis, which will appear 
in three volumes: 
Volume 1: Overview is aimed at a widely varied audience 
of producers and users of systems analysis studies. 
Volume 2: Methods is aimed at systems analysts and other 
members of systems analysis teams who need basic knowledge of 
methods in which they are not expert; this volume contains 
introductory overviews of such methods. 
Volume 3: Cases contains descriptions of actual systems 
analyses that illustrate the diversity of the contexts and 
methods of systems analysis. 
Drafts of the material for Volume 1 are being widely 
circulated for comment and suggested improvement. This Working 
Paper is the current draft of Chapter 7. Correspondence is 
invited. 
Volume 1  will consist of the following ten chapters: 
1. The context, nature, and use of systems analysis 
2. The genesis of applied systems analysis 
3. Examples of applied systems analysis 
4. The methods of applied systems analysis: An 
introduction and overview 
5. Formulating problems for systems analysis 
6. Objectives, constraints, and alternatives 
7. Predicting the consequences: Models and modeling 
8. Guidance for decision 
9. Implementation 
10 .  The practice of applied systems analysis 
To these ten chapters will be added a glossary of systems analysis 
terms and a bibliography of basic works in the field. 
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CHAPTER 7 PRE3ICTING THE CONSEQUENCES: MODELS AND MODELING 
Edward S. Quade 
1. INTRODUCI'ION 
Any model is a caricature of reality. A caricature achieves its effec- 
tiveness by leaving out all but the essential; the model acheves  its util- 
ity by ignoring irrelevant detail. There is always some level of detail 
that an  effective model will not seek to predict, just as there are 
aspects of realism that  no forceful caricature would at tempt to depict. 
Selective focus on the essentials is the key to good modeling. (Holling 
1978) 
Assume that the problem has been clearly defined, the objective specified, 
and a number of alternatives identified that seem worth further investigation. 
Before a decision is made, the decisionmaker ought to know, in so far as possi- 
ble, what the consequences of his choice will be. To predict these consequences, 
one or more models are required, frequently much more elaborate than the 
models employed earlier to identify the alternatives or to define the limits of the 
inquiry. The purpose of this chapter is to show how models are developed, used, 
and refined to increase our confidence in what they tell us. 
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For the problems of sociotechnicalAapplied systems analysis addresses, the 
mformation required for decision is usually obtained by means of carefully 
constructed, explicit models, represented quantitatively (i .e. ,  by using numbers 
and mathematical relations) and expressed at least partly by a computer pro- 
gram. These models are frequently the synthesis of a host of other models, 
simpler in varying degrees, many mental, implicit in the minds of the model 
builders, others explicit, variously expressed by words, diagrams, mathematical 
equations, random numbers, physical forms, or otherwise. There are, of course, 
still further models used by the analyst everywhere throughout the analytic 
process-in problem formulation to define the scope of what is to be included, in 
applying dominance or other schemes to screen the alternatives, in procedures 
to present the results, and, indeed, wherever the analyst has a decision to make. 
Because modeling plays such an  important role in applied systems analysis, 
the two are sometimes considered to be identical. Many studies do have one 
model-the one used to predict the consequences of a choice of alternatives-so 
dominant that the other models employed are seldom mentioned; the world 
modeling community offers examples (see Meadows, Richardson and Bruckman 
1982). Other models are, nevertheless, present and used through the process, 
although most of them may be mental and never made explicit. The model (or 
the group of models considered as a single model) used to predict the conse- 
quences of the alternatives is usually spoken of as "the model" when systems 
analysis is discussed. These predictive models are the subject of this chapter; 
we do not, for instance, discuss the models a decisionmaker may employ to 
make use of the information the analysis provides. 
This chapter begins with an explanation of what models are and why they 
are needed in systems analysis. It then discusses the four broad modeling tech- 
niques models most used in systems analysis. Next, to show how models are built 
and tested, it works through an example and expands the topic. It follows t h s  
with an  explanation of the way these models are used to  produce the necessary 
predictions. Finally, after discussing briefly social experimentation, model 
documentation, and model cost, it closes with a statement of what one can 
expect to get from models and modeling. 
2. THE NEED FOR MODELS 
A model is no more than a set of generalizations or assumptions about the 
world. It is a simplified conceptual or physical image of reality that may be used 
to investigate the behavior of a system or the result of action without altering 
the system or taking the action. The simple scrawl we might use to  represent a 
road network in giving directions to a passing motorist is a model; it replaces 
the need to  escort the motorist to h s  destination. Note that it is a simplifica- 
tion of the real world tailored to a specific purpose; it does not include informa- 
tion extraneous to the purpose in mind such as scenic highlights along the way, 
or where restaurants are located, or when parking is permitted. If the model 
purpose were different, say, because the motorist wanted to  lunch along the 
way, then additional information would have to be included and the model 
changed. 
Everyday decisions by individuals and the predictions on wbch  they depend 
are most often based on judgment derived from an implicit model that exists 
only in the mind. Such a judgmental or mental model is made up of the assurnp- 
tions and intuitions the holder has about the issue with which he is concerned. 
Most decisions, even some of considerable significance to others as  well as to the 
decisionmaker himself, are based largely on implicit or  mental models. 
Nevertheless, as the importance of the decision increases, the originally implicit 
model tends to be made explicit before the decision is taken, as when someone 
lists the pros and c0n.s of an action he is about to take and assigns weights. A t  
other times, a n  implicit model is not only made explicit but supplemented by 
other explicit models such as diagrams, graphs, tables, and/or mathematical 
formulae. Formal studies of even relatively simple issues, however, demand that 
the models be as explicit as possible so that  others can follow the reasoning and 
approve what is done. 
Why are  elaborate models required In applied systems analysis? Why not, 
for instance, try out each alternative on a full scale for a time sufficiently long 
to determine what would happen? There may be exceptions, but in every case I 
can imagine, this would be too expensive, or too dangerous, or otherwise irnprac- 
tical; consider, for example, the Oosterschelde example of Chapter 3. A small- 
scale experiment with a segment of the real world is sometimes a possible, even 
a desirable, way to predict what might happen, but even this would not avoid 
sophisticated mathematical models, for they would be needed to design the 
experiment and to analyze the data. 
I t  is generally agreed among psychologists and phlosophers that the human 
mind operates entirely through models. Mental models have many advantages. 
They can contain rich stores of information, they can handle incommensurable 
factors, and they can balance conflicting values (Meadows, Richardson, and 
Bruckmann 1981), but they have biases and gaps that may be completely unk- 
nown to the holder and undiscovered by anyone else. They cannot, moreover, 
handle problems that demand an extremely precise answer or require 
knowledge Prom too many disciplines. 
Meadows and Robinson (1982) list five reasons why promoters of the com- 
puter as a forecasting tool claim that mathematical models should be superior 
to the best mental models: 
1. Rigor. The assumptions in computer models must be speci- 
fied explicitly, completely, and precisely; no ambiguities are possible. 
Every variable must be defined, and assumptions must be mutually 
consistent. Computer modelers often mention that the discipline 
required to formulate a mathematical model is helpful in organizing 
and clarifying their own mental models, even before any computer 
analysis takes place. 
2. Comprehensiveness. A computer model can manipulate 
more information than the human mind and can keep track of many 
more interrelationshps at  one time. I t  can combine observations from 
many mental models into a more comprehensive picture than could 
ever be contained in a single human head. 
3. Logic. If programmed correctly, the computer can process 
even a very complicated set  of assumptions to draw logical, error-free 
conclusions. The human mind is quite likely to make errors in logic, 
especially if the logical chain is complex. Different people may agree 
completely about a set of assumptions and still disagree about the con- 
clusion to be drawn from them. A computer model should always reach 
the same conclusion from a single set of assumptions. 
4.  Accessibi l i ty .  Because all the assumptions must be explicit, 
precise, and unambiguous in order to communicate them to  the com- 
puter, critics can examine, assess, and alter computer models, 
whereas mental models are virtually unexaminable and uncriticizable. 
5. Tes tab i l i t y .  Computer models can easily test a wide variety 
of &fferent conditions and policies, providing a form of social experi- 
mentation that is much less costly and time-consuming than tests 
within the real social system. 
Computer models have not had either the acceptance or the success that 
many of their advocates feel they should have. Even though a model of this type 
may be an appropriate tool for most problems to  which systems analysis is 
applied, they are,  as Meadows and Robinson go on to say "... more often made 
than used, more often criticized than praised." Judgment, by committees and 
individual experts, largely based on individual mental models, is still widely used 
for tasks that systems analysts would like to  take over. Judgment, moreov,er, by 
committee and individuals, can be improved through the use of structured dis- 
cussion, a form of modeling as yet little employed in applied systems analysis 
(see, however, Holling 1978 and Checkland 1981). 
As said earlier and in Chapter 4, models have many roles in systems 
analysis. In this chapter we are interested in models as devices, processes, or 
procedures to predict, or to a t  least provide insight concerning, the conse- 
quences that result from the choice of an alternative. 
3. MODELING TECHN!QUES 
Models differ in many aspects-in degree of abstraction or complexity, in 
how time or  chance events are handled, and in many other ways-and may be 
classified accordingly. Specht (1968) separates models into five categories: ver- 
bal, people, people and computers, computers, and analytical. Greenberger e t  
al. (1976) distinguish four classes: schematic, physical, symbolic, and role play- 
ing. The simple road map mentioned in the previous section is a schematic 
model; a wooden airfoil in a wind tunnel would be a physical model. The models 
used for predicting the consequences, the so-called systems analysis models, 
while they make use of mental, schematic, and sometimes (but rarely) physical 
modeling, depend for the most part  on four basic modeling techniques: analytic, 
simulation, gaming, and judgmental. A given model may employ more than one 
of these techniques. The common man-machine model-the people and com- 
puter model of Specht's classification-employs simulation, gaming, and.judg- 
mental models, for instance. 
The modeling techniques most used for applied systems analysis are  quanti- 
tative (for instance, represented by mathematical equations or a coded set of 
instructions for a computer). Often they are  the only modeling techniques con- 
sidered for "the model." These models resemble those used in the physical sci- 
ences, consisting of a se t  of logical relations from which one obtains the out- 
come by solving the equations in closed mathematical form or  by or statistical 
analysis. For such a m.odel to be strictly quantitative, i t  would have to represent 
the situation and the activity under investigation so faithfully that  a decision 
could be based solely on the results obtained from the model. For some ques- 
tions, such models may exist, but not when social and political factors are  as 
prevalent as they are in the applications of applied systems analysis; in such 
cases, the model results must always be tempered with judgment-i.e., modified 
by the decisionmaker's and/or the analyst's mental models. Nevertheless, the 
adjective quantitative is applied to any model where most of the relations are  
represented analytically or on a computer. Quantitative models a re  of two 
types: analytic models and simulations, although not all analytic models and 
simulations are quantitative. 
Many issues have major aspects that  cannot be expressed satisfactorily by 
quantitative means. Frequently these are aspects that depend for understand- 
ing on the social sciences where, because of the nature of their subject matter ,  
few models with the predictive quality comparable to the models Pound in the 
physical sciences or even in economics have been developed. Without such 
building blocks, the predictive models for systems analysis must depend on a 
more direct use of judgment and intuition and less on quantitative relations. To 
achleve this dependence, human participants, usually experts or especially qual- 
ified people, are  brought into the model structure. Gaming and group judgment 
are two ways to bring human participants into systems analysis models. 
I will now discuss the four modeling techmques in separate sections, the 
latter two in greater  detail than the former. For more information on analytic 
models and simulations see-in addition to Volume 2 of this Handbook-Green- 
berger et  al. 1976, Chapters 3 and 4, for a good introductory treatment of this 
type of modeling. In addition, Moder and Elmaghraby (1978) and Drake, Keeney 
and Morse (1972) cover more sopbsticated methods and give numerous applica- 
tions. Meadows and Robinson (1982) compare nine studies that  make use of sys- 
tems dynamic, econometric, input-output, and optimization models in various 
combinations and provide useful insights on the effectiveness of computer 
modeling. 
Analytic Models. In an analytic model mathematical statements are  used 
to represent the relations that  hold between the variables of interest. The use of 
mathematics as a surrogate for reality has a long and successful tradition in 
physics and engineering and more recently in operations research. An analytic 
model is particularly desirable because the outcome for a full set of alternatives 
can often be predicted by a closed mathematical form (as by the square root law 
of the Fire Deployment example of Chapter 3) or graphically (as from Figure 3.1 
for the blood-supply example). Problems of flows in networks, queueing, search, 
inventory control, and others can often be modeled analytically. Numerical 
analysis and a computer may bc needed to aid in Pinding a solution, but it is a 
use ol the computer different from that in simulation. 
Most systems analysis models are descriptive. That is, they predict the 
values of a set  of consequences for a particular alternative under a specified set  
of conditions. Ranking the alternatives is done externally to the model. Some- 
times, when the alternatives are  similar and differ only in a se t  of parameter 
values, it is possible to design a "prescriptive" model, which ranks the alterna- 
tives on a performance scale. The user then does not have to compare the alter- 
natives to select the one he prefers; he merely has to  agree on the scale. The 
model contains an  optimization procedure (linear programming, for instance) 
that  indicates the se t  of parameter values that  yields the best value of the  per- 
formance measure (say, the minimum monetary cost to set  up a system). The 
selection is best, however, in an  overall sense only to  the extent that the one- 
dimensional scale on which the  model measures performance incorporates and 
weighs properly all the factors that the decisionmaker has in mind when he 
seeks a best solution. Nevertheless, prescriptive models are the most sought 
after models. 
Simulation. Although every model is a simulation, in operations research 
and systems analysis parlance the term simulation is o f h  used in a special 
sense: simulation is the process of representing item by item and step by step 
the essential features of whatever it is we are  interested in and then predicting 
what is likely to happen by operating with the model case by case, i.e., by 
estimating the results of a proposed action from a series of pseudo experiments 
(pseudo because they a re  performed on the model rather than in the real 
world). The series of experiments is needed to take account of the effects of 
chance on the system (simulation, in systems analysis, is seldom used in a 
deterministic situation, i .e. ,  one where the effects of change can be assumed 
negligible), for each i.ndividua1 experiment with the model may produce a dii- 
ferent outcome. After a large number of experiments, what is likely to  happen 
can then be determined by statistical analysis of the set of outcomes. 
More often than not, the simulation is a computer simulation in which the 
representation is carried out numerically on a digital computer, using 
computer-generated random numbers, frequently without employing any formal 
analytic techniques. A great advantage of t h s  type of simulation is that a digital 
computer, using random numbers, can represent w t h  precision processes for 
which satisfactory analytic approximations do not exist. For example, traffic 
flow, an intricate process, can be expressed in terms of simple events, such as a 
car turning left at an intersection or a vehicle parking, and simple rules, such as 
when attempting to turn left the car waits until oncoming traffic has gone by, or 
a vehcle attempting to park forces the following cars to stop. Typical of many 
real systems, traffic flow is subject to chance elements; thus by selecting ran- 
dom numbers from the appropriate distributions, the computer determines, 
say, whether a given car turns left and for how many oncoming cars it has to 
wait. The computation is carried out at h g h  speed with relations that indicate 
the manner in which real activities might take place in real time. A large meas- 
ure of realism can thus be attained. In fact, the analyst has to guard against 
attempting to provide a one-to-one representation of the real-world process 
rather than abstracting just the features essential to his problem. 
Sirnulation with a hlgh-speed digital computer is an extremely powerful 
technique. A system that is not well enough understood Lor mathematical rela- 
tions between variables to be set up may often be modeled as a simulation and 
the relations discovered. While analytic models are cheaper to use in both t i n e  
and money, simulation is often chosen because it is easier to set  up and not 
costly at the model-building stage. As Bowen (197Ba) remarks: ". . .  In principle, 
. . .  a simulation is t t t  least desirable of models. It has low insight, since it does 
not provide explanation of the observed outcomes, and it may involve an 
undesirably long, confusing, and expensive analysis phase. Nevertheless, it may 
be a correct choice as a model, if only because no other choice is open." 
Gaming. Gaming or operational gaming (recently called interactive simula- 
tion by some who feel gaming is not a suitable term for a serious research 
elfort) is a form of simulation modeling in which analysts, expert consultants, 
and sometimes decisionmakers simulate the behavior of major elements in the 
model. A human "player" may, for instance, simulate the actions of a plant 
manager or of a political party or the changes that  take place in a sector of the 
economy. The players may be assisted by computer simulations and analytic 
models or even play against such models. 
Gaming originated with the military. Military staffs found that  map exer- 
cises in which opposing teams acted out the moves that  might be made by 
opposing armies were useful for examining the  feasibility of war plans and the 
adequacy of logistics. Since the activities of the participants in such an 
encounter bore considerable resemblance to playing a game, the activity came 
to be called gaming. Gaming is now used also to  study future weapons and 
potential conflict between nations. In business i ts  use is widespread, particu- 
larly for training. Although gaming is little used to study public problems, it can 
be argued tha t  some form of gaming is needed if human judgment is to be intro- 
duced into models to investigate such. problems (Bowen, 1978b). 
To illustrate, a game to investigate policy options to counter organized 
crime might be set  up as  below (Quade, 1975b). Three teams would be used: 
1. A player team, Blue, to simulate in some sense a National 
Council on Organized Crime plus local authorities; 
2. A player team, Black, that simulates the activities of organ- 
ized crime in city X; 
3. A control or umpire team, Green, to structure the game, pro- 
vide a startup situation, rule on moves, etc.  
The game would start  from a n  initial situation (prepared by Green) 
with a move by Black-e.g . ,  various ac t.ions involving gambling, loan- 
sharking, dishonest businesses, and the like. T h s  would be followed by 
Blue's move involving mainly actions by the local authorities. The 
results would then be evaluated by the control team, taking into 
account both the local moves and the legislative and operational com- 
ponents of an overall strategy to combat organized crime previously 
formulated by Blue in its role as a National Council: the activity of 
preparing t h s  latter being probably the most important aspect of the 
game. 
After the results are communicated (in part) to  the player teams, 
another move follows. The control team determines the number of 
moves, the timing, updates the scenario, and provides information 
about such factors as the state of the economy and the  political situa- 
tion. Conclusions are drawn at  the end based on the synthetic experi- 
ence of all concerned. 
Gaming can be used to tackle many problems for which no satisfactory 
quantitative model can be constructed. The players can use their intuition and 
judgment to take into account such hard-to-measure factors such as courage, 
cooperation, commitment, and morale. A realistic environ.ment and intelligent 
opponent can force the players in a two-sided game to consider aspects of the 
issue that  might be overlooked were they working in isolation without team- 
mates and without a n  intelligent opposition searchng for flaws in every move. 
Gaming warks well as an educational device and for improving communication 
among players of different disciplines. Its predictive quality, however, is ques- 
tionable for it so clearly depends on the intuitive insights provided by the parti- 
cipants (Quade 19?5a, pp 199-212). For additional discussion, see Helmer 
(1978). 
Difficulties sometimes arise with analytic models and computer simulations 
when the system being modeled contains one or more decisionmakers whose 
decisions influence the model outcome importantly. If these decisionmakers 
follow some simple rules-for example, if they maximize their net benefits-then 
it may be possible to describe their behavior by mathmatical models. Demand 
functions, which express how much of a commodity a consumer will buy a t  vari- 
ous prices, a re  one version of such models. The decisionmaker, however, may 
be something like a legislative body, a political party, a protest group, a pa r t~cu-  
lar individual, or  even inanimate, say a sector of the economy that in our 
present state of knowledge we do not know how to model satisfactorily. Another 
approach is then needed. 
One such is to insert individual "players" into the model to represent these 
internal decisionmakers. These players are then supposed to ac t  like their real- 
life counterparts would act  or, in some circumstances, to optimize with an 
assigned goal in mind (Helmer 1966). In other words, if we know of the 
existence, position, and action possibilities of these decisionmakers whose inter- 
vention may affect the choice of alternatvie, we may try to  imitate their 
behavior by appropriately chosen actors. We expect these actors to behave, in 
the model, in a way that corresponds to what the actual decisionmakers would 
do, or should do, in real-world situations, with all the ambiguity and uncertainty 
there present. Incidently, t h s  is a reason for'the growing irnportance- for sys- 
tems analysis- of the psychological and sociological theory of value and choice. 
We are unable to model-and thus predict-the consequences of a course of 
action unless we understand the laws of behavior of the group that  will be 
affected by it. 
If all of the dependencies, except for human decisionmaking, are  pro- 
grammed into a computer, the whole model becomes an interactiwe model, or 
man-machine model., where human decisions interact with input and output data 
from the computer program. Models of thls type are frequently called "role- 
playing" models and are  usually classed as a form of gaming. 
Judgmental models. In addition to the judgment and intuition of individu- 
als applied through their implicit mental models, the multidisciplinary nature of 
applied systems analysis usually makes reliance on the judgment of several peo- 
ple indispensible. A committee or panel exercising its judgment as a group is a 
firmly established and much used substitute for explicit modeling to provide 
advlce or predictions. It is one, however, that is open to a number of objections, 
based on the well known deficiencies of committee deliberations that affect the 
quality of the end product (Helmer 1978, 1966). There are ,  however, a number 
of ways to structure group discussion that  will improve the focus of its judg- 
ment. These devices include scenario writing, Delph, cross-impact analysis, and 
various team and workshop approaches. They are  models (at  least in an 
extended sense) for  they play the same role in applied systems analysis as simu- 
lation, mathematical modeling, or gaming. The team-workshop approaches, 
such as Lasswell's decision seminar (Brewer 1972, Brewer and Shubik 19791 the 
one used by Holling and his colleagues (1978) to investigate environmental 
management problems, and the scheme used by Checkland (1981) for business 
problems, employ many of the other modeling techniques, such as simulation 
and cross-impact analysis, during their sessions. Except for a remark about 
individual judgment I will confine the discussion to Delph and scenario writing. 
The judgment of an  individual is sometimes used as a direct link in an  oth- 
erwise analytical model to model processes that would otherwise be difficult or 
costly to handle. For instance, there are  models for finding efficient vetucle 
routes and schedules through a network of city streets ,  in which the selection of 
routes by a traffic expert, based on his experience and justified by heuristic 
arguments, is combined with the formal mathematical techniques of graph 
theory to  avoid the computational difficulties that would be required were graph 
theory to be used alone. In IIASA's Energy Program, individual judgmental 
models were used to  link together the various (sub)models where each model 
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evaluated only a particular aspect of the problem (E ne rg~~P rog ram  Group 1981, 
Delphi. Delphi is an iterative procedure for eliciting and refining the opin- 
ions of a group of people by means of a series of individual interrogations. Origi- 
nally the interrogation was by written questionnaire, but more recently on-line 
computer consoles are used to speed up the process. Ideally for systems 
analysis purposes, the group should consist of subject-matter experts and 
especially knowledgeable individuals, possibly including some of the responsible 
decisionmakers. The idea is to improve on the committee process for arriving 
at  a prediction or recommendation by subjecting the views of the individual par- 
ticipants to each other's criticism in ways to avoid the psychological drawbacks 
associated with face-to-face confrontation. To t h s  end, anonymity, to the extent 
that the responses to a question when supplied to the  participants are not attri- 
buted to the  responders, is usually preserved during the  exercise and some- 
times even when i t  is over. 
Discussion is replaced by exchanging information under the control of a 
steering group. In each round of questions after the first, information about the  
outcome of the  previous round is fed back to the participants (without letting 
them know, however, which opinion was contributed by which particular partici- 
pant). As Helmer (1978), one of the developers of the t e c h q u e ,  describes it: "... 
Some of the questions directed to the participating experts may, for instance, 
inquire into the reasons for previously expressed opinions; and a collection of 
such reasons may then be presented to each respondent in the group, together 
with an  invitation to reconsider and possibly revise h s  earlier estimate or, con- 
versely, to s ta te  counterarguments explaining why the reasons presented are 
found unconvincing. This inquiry into the reasons for stated opinions and the  
subsequent feedback of the reasons adduced by others constitutes the elements 
of what may be thought of as  an  anonymous debate which serves to stimulate 
the experts into considering pertinent factors they might through inadvertence 
have overlooked, and to give due weight to considerations they may a t  first have 
been inclined to dismiss as unimportant." As the  communication channel is con- 
trolled, "noise" -material judged irrelevant or redundant-can be reduced. 
Four rounds a re  usually adequate: a second giving reasons for deviations 
from the first-round median; followed by a third with new estimates in the  light 
of the reasons for deviation on the second with counterarguments; followed by a 
fourth estimate in the light of the counterarguments. The median of the  fourth 
round is then used to represent a consensus. (If the result sought is not 
expressed numerically. it can usually be rephrased to permit quantitative 
evaluation.) 
Although the group opinion tends to converge with iteration (as measured 
by the interquartile range, say), the normal outcome is a spread of opinion. 
Using the median to represent the  group response reduces pressure for confor- 
mity and lnsures that  the opinion of every member plays some role in determin- 
ing the final outcome. 
Delphi can be employed whenever expert judgment is required. For this 
reason, i t  is often used in conjunction with gaming. Its purpose is to estimate 
the answers to questions for which there is no "hard" model way to  find the  
answer. There is some experimental evidence that  Delph results are usually 
more accurate than those obtained from a committee, particularly for numeri- 
cal estimates such as forecasts as to  when an event will happen or the future 
value of some index; the  evidence, however, is not adequate enough to convince 
all analysts. Thus Delphi is not a substitute for an  analytic model or simulation 
unless one feels so little confidence in the validity of the models he can con- 
struct  that  he would be willing to depend on committee judgment instead (see 
also Linstone and Turoff 1975). 
Scenario  d i n g .  Before alternative actions can be designed, compared, or 
evaluated, the conditions under w h c h  they are to take place must be known or 
forecast. In applied systems analysis, a scenario is the set  of conditions and 
characteristics that  define the situation or environment under which a system 
or poLicy is assumed to perform. It is a description of the essential features (in 
the sense that they affect the actions under investigation) of the hypothetical 
context or contingency in which the action is to take place. Scenario  w r i t i n g  is 
preparing a logical sequence of hypothetical (but credible) events that  leads 
from the present to the scenario. 
As a form of model building, scenario writing is clearly an  art. There is not 
much that can be formalized or codified about how to  do it well. Olaf Helmer 
(1966, p10) describes i t  as follows: " . . .  Scenario-writing involves a constructive 
use of the imagination. It aims at  describing some aspects of the future, but, 
instead of building up a picture of unrestrained fiction or even of constructing a 
utopian invention that the author considers highly desirable, an operations- 
analytical scenario starts with the present state of the world and shows how, 
step by step, a future state might evolve in a plausible fashon out of the present 
one. Thus, though the purpose of such a scenario is not to predict the future, it 
nevertheless sets out to demonstrate the possibility of a certain future state of 
affairs by exhibiting a reasonable chain of events that might lead to it." 
A scenario can be generated from a simulation or through the sequence of 
plays in an operational game, but, most commonly, it is developed from the 
mental models of one or a few individuals. Scenario writing is not only the most 
frequently used means of deciding on the future contingencies in which alterna- 
tives are to be compared, but it is also a useful device for beginning the con- 
struction of a more analytic model. For further information, see Brown (1968), 
DeWeerd (1973), and Chapter 9 . y ~ h e  central purpose of the IIASA energy study 
described in Chapter 3 was to look a t  the energy supply and demand balance for 
the next fifty years of a world that is notably heterogeneous, a t  least as we view 
it today. Not the least of the highly variable factors is the present per capita 
energy consumption, which in one major world region (North ~ m e r i c a )  is over 40 
times what it is in another (south and southeast Asia and sub-Sahara Africa 
excluding South Africa), thus implying the need for much more economic growth 
in the latter region than in the former. The approach the energy analysis team 
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took was to write scenarios, from this point of view (Energy4Program Group 
1981, volume 1): 
In writing scenarios, we were in no sense attempting to make predic- 
tions. Rather, we viewed scenario writing as a way to organize our 
thinking about available information. Specifically we insisted 
rigorously on two criteria-internal consistency and global comprehen- 
siveness.. . 
The purpose of the scenarios is to detail realistically the engineer- 
ing and economic consequences that  might follow from two sets of rea- 
sonable assumptions [embodied in the high and low scenarios]. The 
results should be interpreted carefully. The numbers are  meant to 
provide insights and to help in meeting the intellectual challenge of 
grasping the dominant characteristics, trends, possibilities, and con- 
straints on global and regional energy considerations. They are not 
predictions, and should serve only as guidelines for determining what 
is feasible over the coming five decades, assuming there are no social 
and political constraints. 
Table 3.6 and Figure 3.10give some of the central results emerging from the ana- 
lyses based on the scenarios. We have commented earlier on a number of 
important lessons emerging from the analysis based on the scenarios-the con- 
tinuing importance of liquid fuels and the need for introducing coal liquefaction 
in a major way by the end of the fifty-year period. Another lesson is worth men- 
tioning here: The fundamental balance of the scenarios could not have been 
acheved without major energy conservation efforts, particularly among the 
developed economies. 
4 M OD.EL BUILDING. 
Even in well established scientific fields model building is not a cut-and- 
dried process but a highly creative activity. 
Developing a simple model. Before listing some general precepts, consider, 
as an illustration of model building, the development of the square-root law used 
in the fire department deployment example of Chapter 3. In its simplest form, 
this model is expressed by the equation 
E(DJ = k l m ,  
where E(D,) is the expected distance between points in the  region a t  which fires 
occur and the closest available engine company, k l  is a constant, A is the  area of 
the region., and N is the number of firehouses that have engines available to 
respond 
The analysts, Kolesar and Blum (1973), had a Peeling that, since area is pro- 
portional to distance squared, there might be a relation of the same sort 
between average travel distance in a region and the area of the region. With this 
in mind, they set out to investigate the possibility for a square city whose 
streets form a rectangular grid with a single firehouse located at the center 
(Fig. 7.1). Within this city, fires were assumed to occur at random, with equal 
probability and severity everywhere. 
The derivation of the model in this case, as described in Walker, Chaiken, 
and Igna11 (1979,pp. 181-182), is as follows: 
We would like to determine the expected response distance for 
thls city's fire company. We begin by answering the question "What is 
the chance that the fire company will have to travel less than s miles?" 
for any distance s that lies between 0 and m. To answer the ques- 
tion, consider a square that is s a  on a side, which is centered inside 
the original one and is oriented the same way. Every point inside this 
square is no further than s from the firehouse, whle every point out- 
side it is further than s from the firehouse. [Because the fire company 
in traveling must follow the streets which are parallel to the axes; all 
points on the boundary are thus the same distance from the fire- 
house.] The chance that the company will have to travel less than s 
miles is, then, the probability that an alarm occurs within the smaller 
square. This probability is the same as the ratio of the area of the 
small square to the area of the city. That is 
P (response distance S s )  = [s42l2/  A ,  
The probability density of response distance, f ( s ) ,  can then be 
obtained by differentiation: f ( s )  = 4s / A .  So the expected response 
distance is given by: 
Path Traveled 
---- 
- m 2  
A Square "City" 
of Area A with a 
Single Firehouse 
Figure 7.1. An idealized city with one firehouse. 
Source: Walker, Chaiken, and Ignall 1979. 
= ( 4 1  3 ) c ~ .  
Hence, in the case of a single company ( N = l )  in a square city, the 
d-2 
square-root law holds with k l  = -= 0 . 4 7 1 4 .  3 
The model was then extended; first to a square city made up of smaller 
square cities, then through stages to more general configurations. In order to 
simplify the mathematical analysis required for these extensions, the analysts 
made a number of assumptions: 
Alarms are distributed randomly but with uniform probability den- 
sity throughout the region of interest 
Firehouses are spread either in a regular pattern or randomly 
throughout the region of interest 
Boundary effects are insignificant 
Units are always available to respond 
Fire companies travel either on a straight line between two points 
or on a dense rectangular grid of streets. 
In the real world, of course, none of these assumptions is strictly 
true. Complications that are not consistent with this simple model 
abound: a city is of finite size and irregular shape: the distribution of 
units is not homogeneous: several companies (in varying numbers) are 
dispatched to each alarm: in the event of a very serious fire, com- 
panies Prom other regions may be relocated into the depleted area: 
and responding units must follow actual street  patterns that are often 
irregular, observe one-way streets, and route themselves around obsta- 
cles such as parks and rivers ... (Walker, Chaiken, and Ignall 1979, p. 
185). 
Notwithstanding such complications, the square root model provides esti- 
mates useful for the pu.rpose for which the model was intended-to estimate the 
average travel distance in a reasonably large region over an extended period of 
time. Before this statement could be made with confidence, however, the model 
had to be extensively tested. The mathematical derivations lent an  air of plausi- 
bility to it ,  but, as these were based on simplifying assumptions that were not 
true in the real world, checks were needed. The testing involved the use of 
alternative models, hstorical data, and simulation (Kolesar and Blurn 1973). 
General remarks. In applied systems analysis, a model builder is likely to 
find hmself working in an  area where the relations between the variables impor- 
tant to his problem are very imprecisely known and the data for improving 
them, while often abundant, must be turned into useful information. His first 
step is to select certain elements as being relevant (and to  set aside for the 
present all others) and to make the relations between them explicit. To do so, 
he uses established models from the disciplines involved where such models are 
known and conjectures the other relations using judgmental models based on his 
own intuition and that  of experts he consults. The choice of techniques should 
follow from the nature of the problem, not the other way around, for, if the 
choice of analytic approach or modeling style comes first, the problem may ! 
have to be altered or even redefined to suit it. 
A t  every stage, the process is full of pitfalls (Majone and Quade, 1980). For 
instance, during data analysis: "This transformation of data into information 
involves three basic judgments, whch all present the risk of serious pitfalls. The 
first is that  the advantages acheved through data reduction compensate for the 
probable loss of information; generally speaking, the  existence of sufficient 
statistics, i.e., of summaries of the data which contain exactly the same amount 
of information as the original sample, is the exception rather than the rule. The 
second is a judgment of the goodness of fit of the model t o  the original data. 
The third is that t h s  particular model, among the infinitely many possible ones, 
is the significant one for the problem under examination. All the operations and 
judgments involved in data reduction, transformation, and testing are,  of 
course, craft operations." (Majone, 1980) 
To build a model means that most aspects of the real world must be aggre- 
gated or simplified. 
Simplifications are of many types. One is to omit factors because they are 
judged to be irrelevant to the outcome. One does not, however, omit factors 
because data or theory do not exist; one simply models them as best he can (see 
Forrester, as quoted in section 3.4). Sometimes factors are omitted because the 
analyst finds them too difficult to quantify. If that is the case, however, they 
must be handled in some other way; preferably by changing the model to a type 
that will accommodate factors that are unquantified. Other simplifications are 
to assume that variables are constants and that complicated relationships are 
linear. [There is always a preference for linear models because well known tech- 
niques exist for solving many such models.] Another is to assume that the aver- 
age value of a function of a variable is equal to the function of the average value 
of that variable. 
Aggregation such as treating areas as points or all members of a class as 
being of one "average" type or replacing stochastic processes by deterministic 
rules are common aggregations that result in simplification. 
Simplifications are introduced for analytical or computational convenience 
(for instance, the assumptions used in deriving the square root model of the 
preceding section) or sometimes to avoid the cost of gathering the data that 
would be required were the more realistic assumptions to be used. It is, of 
course, the purpose of the model that tells us what to include and what to leave 
out. Detail that later turns out to be unneeded may be included at  the start for 
it may take investigation by the analyst to find out what can be omitted or 
aggregated. Compromises are always necessary; sometimes detail that the 
sponsor thinks should be important is included merely to retain kus confidence. 
It should be clearly stated what has been assumed in the way of simplifica- 
tion and why, and, in so far as possible, the sort of uncertainty that the assurnp- 
tion is likely to introduce in the model output. 
Improving a model. The a d  hoc and tentative model that represents the 
analyst's first cut is improved as new information and insight become available. 
To do this, the analyst works with h s  model, trying it out for cases in which the 
results he would like it to produce are known or can be conjectured from other 
models. He heeds the judgment of people experienced in the subject matter 
who feel they can recognize when the model results "seem reasonable." He 
checks h s  model against hstorical data. If it can be made to fit, t h s  does not 
prove the revised model to be true, for by manipulating a few parameters this 
can usually be acheved (Bush and Mosteller 1966). But, if the data are exten- 
sive and the adjustments slight, it tends to increase h s  confidence in the model. 
Verif icat ion.  A model is said to be ver i f ied  if it does what the model builder 
intended it to do. For a computer model, this means that the equations are 
correct and have been properly programmed. Typically, an attempt is made to 
verify such a model by setting some of the data input to extreme values, say 
zero, or by holding some of the input variables constant to determine whether 
the output changes in anticipated ways as the other inputs change. Using such 
trivlal or degenerate cases, however. is not an adequate check. Better is to 
check the output against results provided by previously verified models or by 
testing with sample data that corresponds to known output. As models become 
more elaborate, verification can become extremely difficult (Meadows and 
Robinson 1982). 
Val idat ion Validation is the process of determining that  the outputs of a 
model conform to reality. No model can be validated in an absolute sense. As 
Holling (1978) and h s  coworkers express it: "In fact, it is the central tenet of 
modern scientific method that hypotheses, including models, can never be 
proved right; they can only be proved wrong (Popper, 1959). This is why the fre- 
quent claims of-and demands for-valid models in ecological management, 
impact assessment, and policy design are so unsound. Provisional acceptance of 
any model implies not certainty, but rather a sufficient degree of bel ief  to justify 
further action. In practice, the problem is one of model invalidation-of setting 
the model at risk so as to suggest the limits of its credibility." [Emphasis in the 
original.] 
More recent writers hold absolute invalidation impossible also (Toulmin 
1974; Majone 1980). Nevertheless, one has little confidence in a model that 
appears invalid; for a good description of how invalidation is attempted, see Hol- 
ling (1978). 
In a practical sense, models are valid only in so far as they are accepted by 
the primary decisionmaker and their output judged useful by him in reaching a 
decision. To increase our confidence in a model to  the stage a t  which we are wil- 
ling for it to be used as a laboratory world to test the consequences of alterna- 
tive policies, we subject it to a range of tests and comparisons designed to  
reveal where it fails. When such tests of the model have been completed, the 
model will not have been proved valid and not all the uncertainties will have 
been eliminated; the user will, however, have an understanding of the extent and 
limits of the model's predictive capabilities. 
The more susceptible to invalidation a model is, the less confidence we have 
in it. Often there is empirical evidence that  can be used to calibrate the model 
until it  will predict results that  are  consonant with other existing data. Curve 
fitting is an example of such calibration. This calibration does not, however, 
insure that the model is a good predicter of the future, although it contributes 
to our confidence. 
5. PRFDICTlNG THE CONSEQUENCES 
The consequences that  result from implementation depend both on the 
nature of the alternative and on the context or environment in which it is imple- 
mented. The common practice in systems analysis is, first, to generate by 
scenario writing, by qualitative forecasting methods, or by some other means 
one or more possible future contexts and then, for each such context of 
interest, or  for a representative se t  of such contexts, to determine the conse- 
quences that follow from selecting and implementing of each alternative. 
By the context-called also the environment, state of the world, state of 
nature, or scenario-we mean the aspects of the world existing at  the time the 
alternative is implemented that influence what its consequences will turn out to 
be. Thus, in the Oosterschelde example of section 3.4, to predict the impacts of 
the three alternatives-for instance, the change in attendance at  the sea - 
beaches-a context had to be forecasted (called a scenario there) which speci- 
fied the growth of population, the recreational investment policy, the state of 
the economy, and so on during the time the alternatives were being imple- 
mented. 
Establishing the context. The implementation of alternatives takes place 
in the future. Hence prediction is necessary to specify each possible context. 
More often than not, prediction is by mental model and amounts to no more 
than a judgment that the future will be like the present. Occasionally, only a few 
factors are significant and various mathematical forecasting models can be used 
to define the context. 
In forecasting, we make the essential assumption that the future is partially 
determined by the past, on which data can be made available. This assumption 
implies these important questions related to the data needed for a reliable fore- 
cast: 
(i) How far into the past should the record reach? 
(ii) How broad should the observations be, i.e., how many different 
phenomena must be observed to forecast one selected phenomenon? 
(iii) To what extent can we trade the length of record for number of obser- 
vations, or weigh scanty new data against abundant old? 
(iv) How far ahead can we infer from the data available? 
One should not overestimate the power and possibilities of forecasting tech- 
niques based on statistical data and formal models. For one thing, the data may 
not be rich enough to provide the necessary length and broadness of the record. 
Secondly, the phenomena in the past were observed (measured) with errors. 
Thirdly, there are phenomena to be forecast in some systems analyses that are 
related to phenomena in the past that are either not measurable or missing 
from the statistics. For these reasons alone, in making long-term forecasts of 
changes in technology due to inventions or forecasts of changes in societal and 
political attitudes, expert judgment may do as  well as any computer model we 
have today. 
There certainly are many other cases where expert-based, judgmental fore- 
casting may be appropriate, because human experience and intuition 
may-implicitly and even unconsciously-make use of correlations and associa- 
tions that cannot readily be formalized. The most frequent use of Delphi has 
been for forecasting and parameter estimation. 
Whatever the forecasting techniques, the ability to determine the future in 
terms of reasonable probabilistic confidence is limited. There are many cases in 
analysis where the future that we must consider is more &stant than any expli- 
cit model-based forecast of the external conditions can reach with confidence 
(as in the energy study described in section 3.5). In these cases, the analyst 
tends to predict the future environment by scenarios, i.e., hypothesized chains 
of events. He is still able to say: if the external events follow scenario No. 1, the 
results of the action vvlll be ... , but he cannot say much about the probabilities. 
For questions where there is a considerable interval of time between the 
decision and full implementation, say the time between the  decision to design a 
new supersonic transport and the time it is put into commercial operation, 
predicting the  future can be so uncertain that  it becomes desirable to compare 
alternatives in several different contexts or contingencies (also sometimes 
called alternative futures) that  might come about. A common method for 
preparing these contingencies is also scenario writing. Those tha t  are selected 
for use in comparing the  alternatives are  chosen as  representative of the full set  
of possibilities. How this should be done is not at  all clear. Among those 
selected would be the one considered to be the most likely; others would be 
selected because they might affect the ordering of the alternatives. In military 
analyses, for instance, a "pessimistic" contingency, one in which the enemy is 
assumed to be best prepared to counter the alternatives, would certainly be 
included as well as an "optimistic" contingency, say one in whch it was assumed 
that enemy intelligence had not anticipated certain of the alternatives under 
investigation. Calculation of the consequences for several contingencies may 
then give an idea of the range of uncertainty to be expected. The energy study 
summarized in section 3.4 centered most of its attention on two scenarios look- 
ing 50 years into the future: a high scenario and a low scenario, the former 
assuming a higher economic growth throughout the world and the latter assum- 
ing a lower worldwide economic growth (and Table 3.6 and Figure 3.IOgive results 
that emerged from these two scenarios). However, to explore the appropriate 
sensitivities, the analysis team also looked at three other scenarios: one involved 
a nuclear moratorium, one involved a significantly enhanced nuclear energy 
capability worldwide, and the third assumed that the 2030 energy demand and 
use would be only about double what it is today (or a third less than that in the 
low scenario, a result that keeps the world's per capita energy consumption con- 
stant over the next 50 years). Important insights emerged from all three cases. 
A few summary remarks are appropriate here: 
a) As the probabilities of the scenarios are not known, nothing can be 
said about the ezpected outcome of the action. 
b) It is important to consider several scenarios, and to choose them in a 
systematic way. One of these should be the scenario that seems most likely to 
come about, but comparisons based on others may present special insights. 
Thus, for example, we also want to consider, among others, scenarios that are 
structured so as to present circumstances unfavorable to achieving the objec- 
tive, but which we feel are still likely, 
c) An alternative that is very sensitive to small changes in the scenario 
assumptions should possibly be rejected, or redesigned with the purpose of 
decreasing the sensitivity, even though it may rank high for certain favorable 
circumstances. 
d) Scenarios that represent positions being widely and/or influentially 
held, even i f  they are  a t  extremes, may be important to be explored. For exam- 
ple, the three energy study scenarios just cited clearly respond to the interests 
of the communities wishing to (i) ban nuclear energy altogether, (ii) place prin- 
cipal reliance on it in the world's energy future, and (iii) reduce greatly the 
world's consumption of energy, respectively-and the findings shed important 
light on the potential consequences of these extreme positions. 
Establishing the consequences. Given a context, a model or se t  of models 
is then used to predict the consequences of each alternative. This same model 
set may also serve for the other contexts and all alternatives unless the ~ l ' h ~ ~ a -  
);rS5 are radically different. If they are, another model or  set  of models may 
have to be constructed. For example, unless the alternatives are  of essentially 
the same type, differing only in parameter values, they may generate conse- 
quences of different types and hence may require different models. Thus, in a 
benefit-cost comparison to  determine whether public money would be spent for 
flood control, a new hospital, or an urban park several models would be required 
to determine the benefits of each alternative. 
One of the major difficulties in systems analysis is tha t  the rankings of the 
alternatives may not be the same in all contingencies. Further models, those of 
decision theory, are  sometimes used in such cases (Schlaifer 1969). That is, one 
argues that certain of the contingencies are more likely to occur than others 
and hence probabilities can be assigned to them subjectively. An approach that 
would be appropriate were the probabilities known can then be  used (White and 
Bowen 1975). 
In spite of the many difficulties with large computer models (these difficul- 
ties a re  well treated in Meadows and Robinson 1982), many analysts try to design 
an elaborate computer model that will predict the full spectrum of impacts. A 
better approach, a t  least in my view, is to use a collection of smaller-scale 
models that  can be linked together (Coeller 1973, 1977; Paxson 1971) by means 
of various logical connections (whch are in themselves models). These smaller 
models can be set up on-line on a large computer and, during presentations by 
telephone connection through a portable terminal used to answer questions 
from the decisionmaker regarding changes in the impacts that follow from 
changes in the contingencies and other assumptions. 
Sensitivity analysis. To analyze a model's sensitivity, the analyst changes 
some assumption, parameter value, or structural specification withn the limits 
of uncertainty and then determines the new outcome to discovev the extent to 
which it differs from that of the standard-or base-line-case. In fact, t h s  pro- 
cess is usually repeated for several new values-often high and low 
estimates-that represent reasonable variations of the item of interest. If the 
changes in the outcomes are sufficient to suggest modifying the decision or pol- 
icy that was preferred on the basis of the base-line results, then the model is 
said to be sensitive to the factor involved. To detect possible covariations, it is 
sometimes necessary to change two or more factors simultaneously. "Within the 
limits of uncertainty" is, of course, a subjective judgment; other authors say 
"realistic" changes (Holling 1978). Models that are not sensitive are more credi- 
ble in the sense that their outcomes do not depend so critically on questionable 
assumptions. 
When the assumptions about the context, environment, or scenario are 
changed, rather than those related to the systems model, and the resulting 
changes in the results examined, the process is often called a "contingency" 
analysis. 
In the usual form of sensitivity testing, just one parameter is varied at a 
time. This is seldom good enough (Holling 1978, p. 103); it is almost always 
necessary to test for interactive variation by changing more than one factor at 
once, as mentioned above. However, this approach can easily generate so many 
cases that running them all becomes prohbitively time-consuming. Another way 
to test for sensitivity to a number of parameters simultaneously is to use a 
Monte Carlo sampling process (Emerson 1969). Ths can be done by selecting 
values of the uncertain parameters randomly from their frequency distributions 
for each one of a series of trials. The model result is then determined for each 
set  of parameters. If t h s  is done enough times, we can get an  idea of what is 
required in the way of parameter changes to alter the outcome. 
Sensitivity analysis must of necessity be undertaken in close communica- 
tion with the decisionmaker, since it takes his judgment to decide when a modif- 
ication in his decision is called for. The analyst needs his guidance also in decid- 
mg where to check for sensitivity. 
What sensitivity testing does is help to make explicit the types and degrees 
of uncertainty that exist in the model outcome and to identify the dominant and 
controlling parameters. There is a misconception about sensitivity analysis 
(Bowen 1978a) that sometimes occurs; namely, that  it can compensate for the 
simplification that  occurs in a model when expected values replace stochastic 
processes. 
Sensitivity testing is a powerful way to tackle uncertainty but, if the model 
is elaborate, it can cost  a lot in computer time. The claim made earlier in sec- 
tion 2 that computer models can be easily tested is t rue  in theory but, in prac- 
tice, the expense and the time required tend to rule out extensive testing 
(Meadows and Robinson 1982). 
ASOCIAL EXPERIMENTATION 
One way to  determine the consequences of an  alternative or proposed pro- 
gram may be to perform a n  experiment, that is, actually implement what one 
proposes to  do under controlled conditions and observe the consequences that  
follow. When a n  experiment can be used and is properly deslgned and executed, 
the consequences can be inferred with greater  confidence than from any other 
method. Unfortunately, it is often a completely impractical approach (for 
example, in the flood control example of Chapter 3), or it cannot be properly 
controlled (Nagel and Neef 1979, p. 18Off, give some examples), or it may be too 
expensive. For a discussion of when to conduct a social experiment, how to 
manage one, and some practical advice, see Volume 2. 
7. DOCUMENTATION AND COST 
One of the important hallmarks of professionalism in applied systems 
analysis is that, as a study proceeds, the analysts document their work: assump- 
tions, data, parameter estimates and why they are chosen, model structure and 
details, steps in the analysis, computer code and changes thereto, results, sensi- 
tivity tests, and so on and so on. Thus, at the completion of the work the 
analysis team has the basis for preparing a complete and conscientious docu- 
mentation of their work that will be understandable to someone technically 
trained but not a member of the project team (House and McLeod 1977, pp. 76- 
87; Meadows and Robinson 1982). House and Mcleod suggest standards and for- 
mats for such documentation. 
In the flurry of activity that brings the study to a conclusion and presents 
its findlngs to the client, there is a temptation to slight the final preparation of 
the documentation-or to forgo it altogether. There are compelling reasons for 
the analysts not to yield to this temptation: 
If the study's findings are adopted by the client and implementation 
takes place, new questions will arise that will need further analysis, whch must 
not be delayed while the analysts-either the original ones or new ones brought 
in for the implementation phase-try to puzzle out what was done originally in 
the face of incomplete or inchoate documentation of the original analysis. 
After a major study is completed, it is not unusual for new analysts to 
test the results in various ways-an important step in the process of gaining con- 
fidence in the analysis results. If analysts other than the original ones cannot 
understand the documentation, this confidence is seriously undermined right at 
the start. 
In general, clear and complete documentation buttresses confidence in 
the applied systems analysis; its absence carries with it inevitably the opposite 
effect. 
Beyond these rather practical reasons, there is the overriding one stated at 
the beginning of this section: clear documentation of a study's processes, as well 
as its results-is a hsl'rnark of professionalism in applied systems analysis. 
The costs of building and using a large simulation model or of an opera- 
tional game can be significant. Some idea of what these costs might be are 
given by Shubik and Brewer (1972). 
8. WHAT DO MODELS GIVE US? 
In many clearly defined situations, particularly where repetitive operations 
are involved, models can be designed to give predictions in whch  great confi- 
dence can be placed. The statistical models used in the blood-supply study and 
the deployment models used in the Wilmington fire study of Chapter 3 are exam- 
ples. In contrast, the safety models for the Oosterschelde study yield predic- 
tions that are far less firm; there the analysts had nothng but fragmentary data 
from which to estimate a t  what water level a dike would fail or how much darn- 
age would result from a particular set of dike failures. On account of such unc- 
ertain elements, the models used were challengeable, but until the basic data 
are improved, so are any other models that might be used. 
The predictive models for the sociotechnical problems of applied systems 
analysis are not like the scientific models of, say, mathmatical physics. They 
have not yet been shown to be the appropriate models for identifiable classes of 
real situations. They must be freshly devised-or a t  least modified-for each par- 
ticular application. They can not always be expected to give good results when 
the contingencies with which they are associated are changeable (Boothroyd 
1978). The world is just too complex, unpredictable, and disordered for our 
models of large-scale problems with social impacts to do much more than pro- 
vide useful insights. As Charles Hitch (1957) said of applied systems analysis 
twenty-five years ago (he called it operations research): 
... operations research is the a r t  of sub-optimizing, i.e., of solving some 
lower-level problems, and ... difficulties increase and our special 
competence diminishes by an order of magnitude with every level of 
decision making we attempt to ascend. The sort of simple explicit 
model whch operations researchers are so proficient in using can cer- 
tainly reflect most of the significant factors influencing traffic control 
on the George Washngton Bridge, but the proportion of the relevant 
reality which we can represent by any such model or models in study- 
ing, say, a major foreign-policy decision, appears to be almost trivial. 
Our computer capabilities have increased by a factor of a t  least a hundred since 
then and we can do better, but not a great deal better. 
Models for ecological management, impact assessment, social policy design, 
and for many other issues to whch systems analysis is applied have turned out 
to give predictions in whch our confidence is low. Yet these are important con- 
cerns that must be investigated and the policymaker's choice is limited; either 
he must base h s  predictions and actions on the explicit models developed by 
analysts assisted by using expert judgment or on judgment alone. 
What then do we get from our models if their predictions are so tentative? 
A t  the very least we get insight into the consequences of our alternatives, infor- 
mation that may enable us to intuit improvement in the model and to design a 
better alternative. Indeed, the process of building the model may often be more 
valuable than the results we get from the model itself. "Experts create models, 
but models also create experts" (Greenberger e t  al, 1976). Almost everyone 
agrees that the people involved in modeling learn a great deal about the prob- 
lem. ??us is one of the reasons why many modelers so often push for gaming, for 
it offers a chance to involve the actual policymakers. 
We should not look on systems analysis models as  mere "black boxes" that 
produce predictions when properly stimulated. So narrow a view ignores an 
important process: in using and building models, analysts learn about the prob- 
lem. An explicit model of any kind introduces structure and terminology to a 
problem and provides a means for breaking a complicated decision into smaller 
tasks that can be handled one a t  a time. I t  also serves as an effective means of 
communication, enabling the participants in a study to make their judgments 
within a defined context and in proper relation to the judgments of others. 
Moreover, through feedback-the results of computation in a mathematical 
model or the criticism of an expert's judgment, for instance-the model can help 
the analysts and the experts on whom they depend to revise their earlier judg- 
ments and thus arrive a t  a clearer understanding of their subject matter and of 
the problem. 
These secondary characteristics of a model-separating tasks and providing 
a systematic, efficient, and explicit way to focus judgment and intuition-are 
crucially important, for they provide a way of conjecturing what the major 
consequences may be when adequate quantitative methods are not available 
In connection with the San Diego Clean Ar Project (Goeller et  al. 1973), 
Bruce Goeller developed a number of modeling premises that should be con- 
sidered by every analyst (as quoted by House and McLeod 1 9 7 7 )  : 
The first, and most basic, premise holds that it is impossible for a 
comprehensive model to realis tically internalize the policymaking pro- 
cess, that  is, to individually weigh and trade off the numerous factors 
involved in making a policy decision and to select the preferred alter- 
natives. Past attempts to do so were not considered credible to either 
the researcher or the policymaker. 
To overcome thls deficiency, the policy analyst is viewed as a per- 
son who constructs and maintains a toolkit of models and analytical 
techniques that can be brought to bear on specific policy issues; the 
specific mix of these tools is variable and determined by the specific 
problem.. . 
c 
The second premise is that the method)ogical approach of policy 
analysis models should often differ from that of planning (implementa- 
tion analysis) models because their purposes differ. Policy analysis, in 
our view, is primarily concerned with deci&ng what to do; that is, what 
are preferred. Implementation analysis is concerned with deciding 
how to do somethng; that is, what actions by what institutions will 
bring a particular preferred policy into being. Since they must evalu- 
ate many possible policies in terms of many possible impacts, policy 
analysis models should strive for flexibility, inexpensive operation 
(both m terms of computer and human costs), and relatively fast 
response; moreover, they should allow policies to be described at  a 
relatively gross and conceptual level. Implementation analysis models. 
in contrast, can, and generally do, operate at  a considerably more 
detailed and concrete level, since they will be used to evaluate only a 
few alternatives.. . 
The third premise is that a policy model's primary purpose is to 
improve decision making rather than to improve forecasting per se. 
For example, a relatively crude model that can clearly demonstrate 
that alternative A performs better than alternative B under both favor- 
able and unfavorable assumptions will probably lead to a better deci- 
sion than a complex model that can perform only a highly detailed 
expected value extrapolation. Policy models generally need the capa- 
bility easily to perform various kinds of sensitivity analyses, not only 
on the policies themselves, but on the basic technical and scenario 
assumptions as well.. . 
The fourth premise is that our Rnke~ Toy approach to a 
comprehensive model (where a kit of tools exists that may be used in 
hfferent combinations) is better suited to  many kinds of policy prob- 
lems than the monolithic model approach. With the Tinker Toy 
approach, the component models, which relate to different parts of the 
problem, may be used separately to analyze a. particular part of the 
problem in many different ways, with a minimum of data inertia or 
housekeeping problems, thereby increasing the anayst's understanding 
of that  part of the problem and his ability to design effective policies 
for it. When the component models are used in combination, the out- 
put data set from one model is generally part  of the input data set  of a 
subsequent model. Although the analyst could submit a combination of 
modeis as one computer run, he often gains advantages from making 
separate serial runs. T h s  enables h m  to see various intermediate 
results, to check the output data from one model for reasonableness 
and, if necessary, to modify them before they are  input to the next 
step. He can adaptively intervene in the interaction process between 
the models to reflect the effect of factors that  the models do not expli- 
citly treat or to heuristically increase the efficiency of search or con- 
vergence (Paxson 1971) ... 
The fifth premise is that the design of a comprehensive policy 
model should be decision-maker-oriented from the s ta r t .  Initially, the 
model should be considered as a black box (toolkit!) and the question 
should be what knobs, representing policy variables (and the scenario), 
and what dials, representing impacts, should be put on the front of the 
box to make it useful to the decision makers. Only after this exercise 
should attention be given to designing the algorithmic contents of the 
box. 
The sixth premise is that  there might be synergistic complemen- 
taries from developing comprehensive policy models, using the Tinker 
Toy approach in a region that  already has a fairly well-developed sys- 
tem of planning models. First, and most obvious, the planning models 
could be used as part of the detailed implementation planning process 
after the preferred policy is chosen. Second, they could be used as a 
pump-primer for the policy analysis methodology: By generating 
detailed forecasts of numerous regional characteristics (population 
and land use by small areas, etc.) in machne-readable form, planning 
models provide a voluminous but internally consistent and systematic 
data base that may be aggregated, incorporated, and used in various 
ways by the policy models. T h s  approach can be particularly effective 
for studying the near-term effects of near-term policies since it is com- 
mon to treat  land use and other slowly varying regional quantities as 
exogenous in such studies. In t h s  context, we use the planning rnetho- 
dology to  provide a detailed forecast of the region in the near term 
assuming that the "go nothng" or "existing trends" policies prevail, 
and then use the policy model to predict the impacts of changes in pol- 
icy. We call this a perturbation approach. 
The final premise is that  the practicality and usefulness of a par- 
ticular policy model for other (related) policy problems is strongly 
determined by the concreteness of the original policy problem for 
whlch it was developed. 
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